


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STUDY PROJECT

THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA: THE MEDIA AND THE THIRD ARMY UNDER PATTON AND YEOSOCK

BY

COLONEL SIMON V.L. WILLIS
Australian Army

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
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THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA - THE MEDIA AND THE THIRD ARMY
UNDER PATTON AND YEOSOCK

by

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ABSTRACT

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The relationship between the military and the media has differed with each war and each technological advancement. Nevertheless some problems seem eternal. Since Sir William Russell reported from the Crimea there has been an ongoing debate between the military and the media over the desire and the right to know detail of current or pending military operations. General Patton, during his race across Europe in 1944-5 was very skillful in his use and manipulation of the media. He realized the enormous power of the journalist and used it to his advantage on every possible occasion until ironically it was the very same journalists who presided over his eventual downfall. Years later, with a substantial insight into new technology and the media, General Yeosock led his Third Army into battle in the Middle East. There were ongoing problems between the military and the media and although the military and the media had learned numerous lessons over the years there was still considerable mistrust between both parties. This paper explores the operation of the media in Patton's Third Army in World War II. Using this as a norm the paper compares the operation of the media in Yeosock's Third Army during the Gulf War of 1990-91. The paper describes the operation of the military and the media under both generals, the changes and advances made during the intervening period and identifies critical lessons.

These are the days of miracle and wonder
This is the long distant call
The way the camera follows us in slow-mo
The way we look to us all.

Paul Simon
The Boy in the Bubble
New York, 1985.

When Paul Simon wrote these lines he was commenting on modern society and how it was affected by technology. The boy in the bubble was the simple image he used to describe how every act is subject to scrutiny by others and how there was very little which could be done about it. The boy was news and, for better or worse, the world wanted to know his whole story and the press went to extreme lengths to report on his condition. The relationship between the boy in the bubble and the media and that between the media and the military is not dissimilar; in essence, although their views are often strenuously at odds, they need each other.

In some ways this is rather ironic as it was the military that played an important part in the institution of the daily newspaper and journalism. But even if the military had its time again attitudes would be little different.¹ Sir William Russell is regarded as the father of the modern war correspondents, although the contribution of such correspondents can be traced back to the English Civil War of the 1640's.² Since then, there has been an ongoing debate between the military and the Fourth Estate over their desire and right to know. There is no doubt that war is news, and since the Crimean War, whenever soldiers have gone to war

so have the reporters.

In 1886 General Viscount Wolseley, Adjutant General of the British Army, who throughout his career had manipulated and deceived war correspondents³, produced his fifth edition of his The Soldier's Pocket Book. His opening sentence in the section on newspaper correspondents could have been written today.

Soldiers of course object to their presence in camp upon military grounds, but as long as the British public's craze for sensational news remains as it is now, the English General must accept the position.⁴

The military and the media need each other. But unfortunately, the match was not made in Heaven but a match it is. In this day and age, the military needs to get its message across to an increasingly involved public and the media is the means by which this is achieved. At the same time, the media needs to fill that ravenous column inch or thirty second sound bite and often being first is more important than being factual.

The 'Golden Age' of the war correspondent is defined as the period between the Crimean War and World War I.⁵ During World War I the correspondents were generally tightly controlled, manipulated, and were virtual appendages of the general staff. The Australian C.E.W. Bean⁶ and the American correspondents who added a fresh approach in the latter stages of the war were the exceptions to a group of journalists who were for the most part unwanted and chateau bound. Systematic espionage was also

introduced during this war, along with the need for more secrecy and restraint. This culminated in the US Espionage act of 1917 which mandated what could be published and the penalties for violation, adding another restraint which inhibited fearless and independent reporting.⁷

Prior to World War II, journalists made some advances in gaining access to real news and enhanced their battlefield mobility. But by the outbreak of the war they were no more accepted than they had been in 1918. By the start of the Second World War, journalists were seen to be more organized but there was much debate as to whether they were more professional. Phillip Knightly, in "The First Casualty", argues that much of the reporting of the Spanish Civil War was influenced by partisanship and manipulation, and journalists carried this reputation into World War II.⁸ With the exception of organization it seems, at a glance, that little had changed since the days when Russell was seen as a treacherous scoundrel. The military and the media seemed always at odds and often it appeared that the battles between the media and the military were more venomous than those with the opposing forces.

However, this conflict was not universal. Some military leaders actively cultivated the media; some would suspect that this was not necessarily for the national good but more to advance their own careers. Douglas MacArthur and George Patton managed the war

correspondents in their areas so well that they successfully used them to get their messages across to a public hungry for any news. What, then, was the media situation in Europe during the Second World War? How did the media operate? What did we learn from these experiences? Did the military apply the lessons many years later during the Gulf War? This paper will attempt to determine what changes and advances have been made in the military/media relationship by comparing Patton's Third Army of 1944-45 and Yeosock's Third Army of the Gulf War of 1990-91.

By the time Patton took command of the newly operational Third Army,⁹ he already had a considerable reputation. He was fully aware of the power of the press and used it to his advantage whenever possible. He was equally aware that profanity made good copy and in an article for Life magazine in 1941, while commanding the 1st Armored Division, stated that he had no intention of repressing his spirits, as such action stirred the pride amongst his men and was good for morale.¹⁰

Patton first came to notice during the war for his actions at Gabes and El Guettar in March of 1943. He received wide publicity for his counter-attack at Kasserine, from which he personally benefitted. There was even a report that Patton had challenged Rommel to a duel, the weapon of choice being a tank. 'Just like Patton', the enchanted public said, and after only one month of Operation TORCH¹¹, he had been mentioned in over 1300 articles,

many of which, at his insistence were focused on his soldiers.¹²

In April 1944 censorship planning reached the final phase in preparation for the Allied assault on Europe.¹³ The planning centered on the organization and assignment of field censorship sections to accompany assault troops and for provision for a higher headquarters organization. It is interesting to note that in the booklet, 'Regulations For War Correspondents', issued to correspondents accompanying the Allied Expeditionary Force, General Eisenhower in his foreword stated;

With regard to publicity, the first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile these sometimes diverse considerations.¹⁴

This booklet laid down all the rules and regulations applicable to the correspondents. The most important part of the small booklet was appendix A. This covered censorship and its application and listed a guide to any items which were not to be mentioned in press reports.¹⁵

Censorship teams were organized into groups which were attached to formations and accompanied them to the field. The role of these teams was simply to vet copy, photographs (including captions), newsreel commentaries, broadcast scripts, sketches and personal correspondence. Sealing and franking personal letters and private business communication was specifically forbidden.

The 3rd Army Press Censorship Team consisted of seven officers and three enlisted men.¹⁶ They left London on July 4th 1944 and, as the 3rd Army was not officially operational, they were attached to the 1st Army team at Veuilly, France, to gain field experience.¹⁷ During this period the 3rd Army correspondents experienced difficulties as they were 20 miles from the 1st Army press camp and had little opportunity to attend briefings and had little knowledge of censorship stops. This lack of communication led to the correspondents accusing the censors of mutilating their stories and this impaired the press/3rd Army relationships even before the Army was operational.¹⁸

Following the St Lo breakthrough in July 1944 the 3rd Army team became active in its own right and moved to Equilly and set up its own camp with the 3rd Army. This removed most of the conditions that contributed to the initial problems. Even so, Patton's appointment as commander of the 3rd Army was inadvertently released at SHAEF prior to the expiration of the embargo time given. This slip, combined with the release to 1st Army correspondents of classified details of Operation COBRA¹⁹, did little to enhance the military/press relationship. It was a stupid mistake by Patton's Public Relations Officer and Patton realized as much. He decided to relieve the officer, but not until the operation was under way. Nevertheless, Patton called a group of 40 correspondents together and explained the error. He finished by saying to the assembled gathering of correspondents;

Nothing like this can ever happen again if we are to carry on. If anybody asks you whether you have been briefed on the operation, you must stay mute. I am trusting you, gentlemen.²⁰

After this incident relationships greatly improved. Patton had established his method of dealing with the correspondents who accompanied the 3rd Army on its race across Europe. In his report, Press Censorship in the European Field of Operations, Colonel Simpson simply stated, "...the flow of guidance from higher headquarters was greatly improved."²¹ This "guidance" often took the form of personal briefings by Patton. The Patton Papers indicate that these briefings occurred at least monthly in the earlier stages of his advance and increased in frequency as he successfully crossed France and into Germany. His technique was simple; he was straightforward and to the point, and he did not hesitate to tell the correspondents the real story. At the same time his directions were crystal clear as to what could be reported and what was "background". In hindsight, this was an excellent tactic. While he gained the confidence and respect of the correspondents by passing on information which was clearly classified he effectively short-circuited their options. If a journalist betrayed this confidence Patton had the official backup of the 3rd Army censors, who could amend any copy which was in danger of compromising operations. For example, at a press conference on September 8th 1944 Patton was asked where his Army was supposed to be on D+90. He replied, "We were supposed to be just short of Paris D+90. That mustn't come out."²²

Patton also directed the correspondents as to what he would like them to report in an effort to support operations and to deceive the enemy. The fact that what appeared in the press was a lie did not appear to matter as much as the result.²³ On the November 6th 1944 he met with the correspondents attached to the 3rd Army and said:

I told you we were going to be stopped for a while, and I was correct. Now, we are going to start again...You all do some lying and say this is simply what we called in the last war "correcting a line." In other words, I do not want the Germans to start moving reserves until they have to.²⁴

Another example of Patton's directives to journalists comes from the press conference he held on March 17th 1945 in Luxembourg:

I want the Germans to know we have four armored divisions jumping on them - the 4th, 10th, 11th and 12th. The 12th goes tomorrow morning. Of course you needn't say where...²⁵

Patton was fully aware of the power of the press and he openly manipulated them in a manner which would be unthinkable today. Nevertheless, he did treat them as if they were almost a unit of his command for the greater good of the war effort and the immediate task at hand. The journalists identified and bonded with the 3rd Army troops and this bond strengthened with time and commensurate advantages for the military.

Patton always told journalists the truth and did not deceive them as to what his real intentions were, secure in the knowledge

that the 3rd Army censors would restrict journalists who did not practice self-censorship. As the examples show Patton told reporters what he wanted from them and thanked them when they did a good job just as a commander would thank his staff.²⁶ Patton was good copy and with rare exception his performances at press conferences were superb. He "... played up to the correspondents, reinforced his image of being profane, colorful, yet thoroughly professional".²⁷

Patton, by his management of the 3rd Army journalists, avoided many problems he could have had in the operational sphere. The same, however, cannot be said of his relations with the media in a more general or day-to-day sense. Before he took command of the 3rd Army he had his share of negative reporting, some his fault, some not. After an article by an American based reporter in the April 1943 Time magazine alleged Patton had made disparaging remarks about American soldiers, he mentioned his feelings in a letter to his wife Beatrice.²⁸ The article was proven to be untrue and even the theater-based Time correspondent sent a long telegram of protest to the editors.²⁹ The infamous slapping incident of mid 1943 almost brought about his downfall but after apologizing to all concerned he was able continue his love-hate relationship with the press.

By 1945, Patton's relations with some of the press returned to his mid 1943 levels. On January 15th he felt compelled to write to

the editor of the Stars and Stripes complaining about a cartoon which he determined was , "subversive of discipline".³⁰ A general peace remained with the press until March 20th 1945 when he confided to Beatrice in a letter, "...how I hate the press."³¹ Newspapers had featured an article about Patton's officer son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel John Waters. Waters had been captured and was incarcerated with 1500 other officers in Hammelburg, Poland. A force under Captain Abraham Baum had failed in an attempt to rescue them and in the attempt a number of soldiers were killed.³² The articles indicated that the primary aim was to rescue Waters and that such a sacrifice was senseless. A complicating factor was that Patton's aide, Major Stiller, had accompanied the rescue force at Patton's request. Stiller and Baum were both captured in the attempt, adding fuel to the fire.

For a man who managed the press as Patton did, and a press that had done much to create his legend, it was perhaps apposite that media reports eventually played a part in his downfall. On October 7th 1945 he handed over command after a controversy about "Semitic Communists" attempting to dismember Germany.³³ A number of back-up press conferences where he attempted to clarify his statement failed to remedy the situation.

Thirty years after the end of the war, Charles Lynch, a Canadian journalist who had been accredited to the British Army for Reuters was extremely critical of the part played by journalists.

Although it appears easy for Lynch to criticize with such a time jump and the experience of Korea, Vietnam and many other small wars from which to draw experience, what he said bears more than a grain of truth and is as good a summary of the manner in which the press worked with the 3rd Army as any.

We were a propaganda arm of our governments. At the start the censors enforced that, but by the end we were our own censors. We were cheerleaders. I suppose there wasn't an alternative at the time. It was total war. But, for God's sake, lets not glorify our role. It wasn't good journalism. It wasn't journalism at all.³⁴

Lynch would have felt at home with many of his media colleagues at the conclusion of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Professor Lloyd argues that the news management strategy of the US military was based on rigorous censorship, strictly controlled briefing sessions, provision of authorized film and pictorial material and posting of media pools under strict military regulation and guidance.³⁵ One thing is certain; the military were in control during the Gulf War, but whether this control amounted to censorship and manipulation is another matter. The important issue is the amount of control exercised by the military during the conflict and was it justified.

During the forty-five years since Patton's war, the military have learned much from their encounters with the media during several conflicts. The media during this same time have gained powerful new tools to assist them in their news gathering and

reporting, tools which give the reporter the ability to report instantaneously from virtually any point on earth. These reports do not discriminate as to who receives the information, whether it is Joe Citizen at home, or the enemy commander in his command post watching a world wide news report.

With the experience of the Vietnam reporting, marked by journalistic inexperience and sensationalism as much as political and military ineptitude, and the backlash from the total blackout imposed during the invasion of Grenada, the US bureaucracy were determined during the Gulf crisis to work with the media instead of against them.

On August 2nd 1990 at 2 am, local time, Iraqi forces crossed the border into Kuwait. Baghdad stated the Kuwaiti government had been overthrown by revolution and its forces were there to assist the new rulers. The United Nations saw it a little differently and the Security Council voted 14 - 0 to condemn the action. On August 6th the Security Council adopted Resolution 661 authorizing world wide economic sanctions against Iraq. Over the next weeks an international coalition of forces formed which eventually comprised service personnel from 29 countries. These forces, although serving through various command chains, were effectively controlled by USCENTCOM³⁶ under the command of US Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf.

The troop build-up continued over the months and as the mission changed from one of defense of Saudi Arabia to the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the US 3rd Army expanded under General John Yeosock in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO).³⁷ AT this early stage the buildup was being covered by the Press Pool of 17 media representatives who deployed with six military press officers and arrived in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on August 13th 1990.³⁸ Seventeen days later the first rumblings of World War II censorship were heard when Michael Gartner, president of NBC News wrote;

Here's something you should know about that war (sic) that's going on in the Gulf; much of the news that you read or hear or see is being censoredThere is no excuse for this kind of censorship (which) exceeds even the most stringent censorship of World War II.³⁹

Although this statement greatly overstated the problem, it was the first of many media comparisons which were drawn between the two wars particularly regarding censorship. Peter Braestrup in the foreword to John Fialka's book, Hotel Warriors, compares the journalists waiting in Dhahran and Riyadh to the journalists waiting in London for D-Day. The presence of Public Affairs Officers as escorts drew unpleasant parallels with World War II censors and escorts, who would accompany reporters to US units. Their presence resulted in what the media referred to as, "...censorship by lack of access", and this condition was one of the major concerns of the correspondents during the Gulf War.⁴⁰

The forward element of HQ 3rd Army was operational in the KTO on

August 12th 1990, and as such tied in its Public Affairs plan with the extant USARCENT⁴¹ plan. This plan was in itself based on guidance from the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff which laid down National Media Pool planning requirements.⁴² As the Gulf War was the first major American war to be covered by a news media with the ability to broadcast instantaneously world wide, the Department of Defence was determined to balance the needs of the media with those of the military. The Department of Defence Post War Report to Congress states clearly that the goal of meetings with the media from the outbreak of the conflict was to:

...provide as much information as possible to the American people without endangering the lives or missions of US military personnel.⁴³

As in World War II, the war correspondents needed to be accredited to be allowed into the area of operations. The major difference, however, was in the enormous numbers of correspondents from a variety of countries who wanted to move forward to be with the combat troops. Patton had to put up with on average only 40 correspondents, whereas at least 1600 reporters, armed with the latest in technology, were present in Saudi Arabia.⁴⁴ As it was the pool system, effective from 12th to 24th August 1990 and from January 1st 1991 until the end of the war, restricted any independent movement around the KTO and most correspondents remained in Dhahran and Riyadh. There they received most of their news from the CENTCOM established Joint Information Bureaus and the media pools who were authorized to move forward to the troops.

These pools when attached to units and formations tended to remain with those troops and they, like Patton's correspondents, built up solid relationships based on a growing understanding of each other's job. This level of bonding, or the absence of it from groupings established at the last minute, was the cause of many difficulties encountered by both the military and the media during the latter stages of the war.

Fewer than 100 members⁴⁵ of the foreign news media spent any time with the forward units during the entire campaign and approximately 75 of the US based correspondents remained in pools at any given time during the war.⁴⁶ On the other hand, Patton's attached war correspondents remained with his Army and were able to bond with the units. This certainly happened in some of Yeosock's units but was out of the ordinary and generally unplanned.

General John Yeosock was in a completely different position from that of Patton. Patton was a Field Army commander and he was able to apply himself fully to the task of commanding that Army. On the contrary, Yeosock was not only the commander of 3rd Army but he was also the defacto Land Component Commander and was responsible for Theater Army support functions. He had to provide the interface with the coalition partners as well as with General Horner, the Air component Commander, and General Schwarzkopf and, as such, perhaps it is a little unfair to try and directly compare him with Patton. Nevertheless, there are comparisons which can be

drawn between the two men especially with regards the media.

Both Patton and Yeosock were keenly interested in the well being of their men and were keen for the media to meet with them to get their story. Yeosock was aware of the inexperience of many reporters and he took time to try to explain to them the basics of the military art so that they had a better understanding of what was happening and what was planned.⁴⁷ Yeosock did not seek publicity like Patton for he realized that one personality such as Schwarzkopf was sufficient for the KTO. In discussions after the war with his Executive Officer, Yeosock said that with the wisdom of hindsight he should have been more concerned with the press and their problems; and the press were having problems.

Yeosock did not hold press conferences as Patton had. This is more due to technological advances since World War II and the method of operation of General Schwarzkopf and the Department of Defence briefings than anything. Nevertheless, when asked by the press, he was always happy to provide all the information he could and provide whatever perspective necessary within the limits of operational security.

During the latter stages of the air campaign the press had two concerns in relation to media coverage that they deemed important enough to write to General Yeosock about.⁴⁸ First, they requested dedicated helicopter support to back-load copy and video-tape to

the Joint Information Bureau so timely coverage could be achieved once the expected ground offensive began. Secondly, they asked for clearance to expand the number of operating pools accompanying land units to enable complete coverage of the imminent battles. Unfortunately, at this time Yeosock fell ill and, was hospitalized with pneumonia on February 14th.⁴⁹ He was subsequently evacuated on February 17th to Germany for a gall bladder operation and although he returned to the KTO on the 21st February he did not re-assume command of the 3rd Army until 1200 Hrs, February 23rd, 18 hours before the ground offensive began. In the meantime, General Waller, the acting commander 3rd Army had decided against the requests and, by the time Yeosock returned to active duty it was too late to effect any changes.⁵⁰

It is noteworthy that 126 additional media representatives left Andrews Air Force Base on January 17th 1991 on a tasked C 141 boosting the media numbers at this critical moment. Fialka, argues that this was the result of pressure applied by Washington based bureau chiefs, whereas this increase was planned and included in the CENTCOM operational plan released on January 5th.⁵¹

The Public Affairs Officers role was to accompany the media representatives around the battlefield and provide every opportunity to observe combat. This is clearly stated in the Operation DESERT STORM Operations Order as is the goal to treat reporters as though they were "members of units". The Order also

clearly stated that the media were entitled to administrative support not dissimilar to that supplied to press representatives in support of Patton's 3rd Army.⁵² The biggest complaint from the media related to the apparent lack of urgency in getting, "copy", back from the forward units to rear links to the United States. The relativity between the wars here is important, for in World War II journalists were able to file their cleared stories as fast as technology allowed, whereas during the Gulf War the time between clearance and transmission varied from instantaneous to weeks. Unfortunately, it was the stories from the forward units that were delayed for myriad reasons, most of them being avoidable. Fialka has summarized the whole coverage and transmission problem:

The Army-designed pony express system of couriers and its teams of reporter escorts were hopelessly understaffed, underequipped, and poorly trained and motivated for the job. The upshot: As the battles raged, we and news copy, film, and videotapes spent a lot of valuable time lost in the desert.⁵³

It is interesting to speculate whether the same situation would have occurred if General Yeosock had remained in command during this critical period. Personalities cannot be removed from the equation, for in the Marine area of operations a completely different situation and system was in play and had been since the initial deployment. Although they did have geography on their side, the Marines appeared to understand the importance of the timeliness of news and did all in their power to assist their pool journalists.⁵⁴ The fact that the Marine commander, General Walt

Boomer, had been the Chief PAO for the USMC probably had a great deal to do with their successful media operations. Although open to debate, if raw figures are compared the Marines dominated the print media and at least shared air time with the Army which is a considerable imbalance given relative strengths. Additionally the stories from reporters attached to the Marines included more detail which did not appear to hinder or compromise operations. Nevertheless it is interesting that blood appeared on the television only on one occasion during the conduct of the war. Ironically this was when an air raid shelter was bombed and footage from Peter Arnett in Baghdad of the destruction and consequent Iraqi public outcry was aired on CNN. It is left to speculation as to why no footage of the results of the air campaign or the armored encounters was seen. Whether the press were steered away from such areas, the video footage was lost in transit or it was not timely enough to warrant showing when it was finally received is difficult to determine, but there appears an element of truth in all suggestions. Historical footage indicates that no such qualms existed during Patton's race across Europe, and it must be pondered whether lingering memories of the Vietnam war might have motivated the actions of commanders in the Gulf.

Evidence suggests that General Yeosock was rightly involved in military matters and many of the media problems did not come to his attention, and if they did, they did not appear to deserve greater attention than other matters at hand. An additional factor

appears to be that HQ 3rd Army did not have a Public Affairs Officer at the outbreak of the war and the 2nd Army Public Affairs Officer was cross posted after General Yeosock was established in the Gulf.⁵⁵ This lack of familiarity with the staff and the fact that the Public Affairs Officer was not aggressive in the execution of his job did little to remedy the situation. A closer relationship between the commander and the PAO may have resulted in a different staff approach and a more pro-active relationship with the media.

The key issues that are most likely to cause friction between the military and the media during conflict are censorship, manipulation and the timely reporting of newsworthy events. On all counts, the military appeared to be guilty of the sin of omission, if not commission, on some occasions. On the macro scale the public seem content with the press output they received during the Gulf War. This must be gratifying for the Military on the whole but in the 3rd Army area the reported result was far from satisfactory.⁵⁶ The litany of lost stories and lack of understanding of press needs indicates that what the Army has learned about the needs of the media since the experiences of World War II is subject to command personality over-ride.

The lessons from the Gulf War are not new and, in fact, were confirmation of what had been learned during previous conflicts. Of all issues, cooperation between the military and the media is

clearly the most enduring and important. This cooperation does not just happen and, as both examples have shown, it takes considerable effort from all parties to achieve. Cooperation is developed over time and results from familiarity with each others' requirements and a mutual trust. Unfortunately, few news organizations can spare their reporters for the extended periods necessary for them to become comfortable in the military environment on an ongoing basis and often inexperienced reporters are the first committed.

This unfamiliarity demands that Public Affairs Officers accompany most media groups to ensure that they have maximum mobility around the battlefield without jeopardizing the security of the military forces. Unfortunately any restriction on movement or reporting that is introduced for military security reasons is seen by the media as censorship. Post World War II journalists complained of censorship and manipulation by military leaders and since the end of the Gulf War many media representatives have aired similar complaints. Whether this is true or not will be debated for many years to come, particularly as the military and media pursue basically different and contradictory agendas.

The military are charged with weighty problems at a national level whose achievement often relies on secrecy and deception. In pursuit of these objectives, military commanders take a dim view of anyone who, for any reason, endeavors to undermine their efforts to achieve success in the shortest possible time frame. On the other

hand, journalists argue that their aim is to identify and report on excesses and incompetence by the servants of the state as well as reporting news. In the 140 years since Sir William Russell reported the real story from the Crimean front both sides have had their day. But a lingering mistrust remains. Technological advances have brought war news "live" to the homes of a world which is better educated and, therefore, more determined to decide for themselves what should or should not happen. In some respects, the military have been dragged kicking and screaming into the real world of the media. However, one thing that is certain in democratic society is that the media must remain active and therefore the military must learn to work with them.

The phrase, "work with them", has been used deliberately as many leaders believe the media should be used or managed for their own ends other than endeavoring to build up a relationship based on trust. It is inevitable that the media will be represented at any conflict no matter the level. Therefore, military leaders should prepare for their presence and plan with the full realization that whatever they do or plan to do will someday be subject to public scrutiny.

Clausewitz could not have been more correct when he included public will as an element of his, "remarkable trinity". The military have learned the hard way as exemplified in Vietnam, that once the trust of the people is lost, their will and support will

soon follow.⁵⁷ The military also know that, without support, success in drawn-out campaigns will be only short-lived and that this public support is very much molded by the media. It is clearly in the military's interest to ensure that journalists report accurately and factually in an environment where getting the story first may be more important than getting it right. Getting it right does not magically happen, so commanders must ensure when planning a campaign, that they institute a system which endeavors to circumvent media related problems. How this is done in detail is not the subject of this paper. Nevertheless, it is enough to state that a pool system which ensures the provision of transport, accommodation, health, food, training, communications combined with a clear policy stated at the initiation of the conflict, will do much to ease the friction between the parties. However, communications and policy are so important in the planning that they require some further explanation here.

The policy on public information can be simply stated but the military must plan from the outset how it is to be effected as they did in the Gulf. Commanders must ensure that the policy is implemented and information is given to reporters in a timely manner so they can report factually within their deadlines. Trained Public Affairs Officers must be accessible and kept fully abreast of the situation to avoid inadvertently briefing or restricting copy based on outdated or incorrect information - this requires thorough planning at the highest level. Additionally any attempt to withhold information for other than a valid security

reason or the lack of a timely method of passage of information, rapidly leads to accusations of censorship. Too many examples of journalists finding it difficult to transmit stories, as happened to American journalists in the Gulf War, will often lead to negative reporting which will slowly but inevitably eat away at the public confidence. The saving grace on this occasion was that the ground war lasted only 100 hours, thereby not allowing the problem to manifest to any degree which would have started to undermine public confidence. Therefore, planners must organize from the outset to do whatever is possible to assist a given number of journalists and, in many cases, rely on their judgement otherwise it is the military and the nation who will suffer in the long run. Last minute additions to pools without satisfactory administrative support is suicidal as all that is manifest is dissatisfied and angry individuals on both sides with truth being a primary casualty.

The public will eventually learn the truth so the whole problem may best be seen as one of timing. The public's desire to know and their right to know must be compared. When all is going well not many demands are placed on the military as "desire" outstrips "right". When things go wrong the public will demand all kinds of information regardless of the strategic or operational security as they see this as their right. A full and proper debate of campaign objectives at the outset and consideration of how news is to get to the people is not only valid but proper. This lesson

has clearly been learned as the example of Operation RESTORE HOPE testifies.⁵⁸

When preparing for a campaign, planners must appreciate that one media release can completely destroy security. We are all aware of recent experiences, particularly the British example where a BBC journalist[†] revealed operational intentions relating to an assault by the Parachute Regiment during the Falklands campaign, resulting in arguably higher casualties than necessary.⁵⁹ It is important that leaders do not let such events completely color their views of journalists but plan for operational security to avoid such incidences.

One element which is a planning constant is deception. This should be a basic consideration or principle for the military but deception is a word and practice with nasty connotations for the media. A plan which does not include deception drastically reduces the chances of success. These days only through trust and mature relationships will the military be able to educate journalists that the target of such deception is the enemy, not the public. Patton's method of directing what he wanted to see in media reports in an effort to deceive the enemy are long gone. Nevertheless, should a story be released on the initiative of the media that is not factually correct, it is within the realm of consistency to let the story run without correction if it is in the military's interest. An example of this was the "planned" Marine invasion of

Kuwait which, in hindsight, was never part of the operational plan but was never corrected by military planners because of the important advantage it gave the allied forces. This however continues to haunt the military as many journalists believe they were blatantly manipulated by the military for operational reasons in situations not unlike those of World War II.⁶⁰

From the other perspective, the effect of psychological warfare as a force multiplier must be considered. Psychological warfare uses multi-media channels to achieve its aims and can be most effective. An excellent example comes again from the Gulf War where a conscious decision was made to leave CNN on the air in Iraq. Although not clinically a public information policy initiative, the air campaign planners were prohibited from bombing the Al Rasheed Hotel. Although the concern for the western journalists was probably the primary motive this action allowed specific messages to reach the enemy command and, additionally allowed the psychological warfare operations element of the campaign to target the Iraqi population. Additionally, CNN was relied upon by Middle East leaders as a sort of 24 hour instant information service as well serving 103 countries around the world.⁶¹

A mature working relationship with the media cannot occur consistently without thorough initial planning. A military leader charged with planning a campaign must consider the media. A leader who does not consider the requirements of the media, who does not

plan his use of and handling of the media and the education of his subordinates in media matters, who does not plan to provide for their needs - both professional and personal - is doomed to eventual failure in any drawn-out campaign. Media coverage of conflict in a democratic society is as important as it is inevitable. In this day and age, any commander must consider his public information policy and, whether we like it or not, it must be given as much emphasis as any other principle of war when planning a campaign.

In the end, the best way to launch a Twentieth Century operation or campaign is with a military/media relationship which is well established and based on trust. The lessons learned by Patton and leaders who followed were put to good use during the Gulf War, but the military and the media still have some way to go. Perhaps the whole issue is irreconcilable but that is no reason to avoid pertinent problems and not to do all that is possible to allow both sides to operate within reasonable bounds. A mutual trust built in peace will not last unless each others' needs are understood and these needs reflected in a reasonable and well thought out public information policy.

ENDNOTES

1. General Peter Gration, Keynote Address at 1st International Conference on Defence and the Media. He explained that in 11BC when Caesar Augustus, displeased with an irregular news sheet "published" by the Senate called upon an Army unit to terminate circulation and produce a substitute. The substitute was called, "Acta Dirna", or news of the day....its writers were called diurnalists, which was later corrupted to journalists.
2. Anthony Smith, The Politics of Information, London, 1938.
3. Major General Sir Frederick Maurice and Sir George Arthur, The Life of Lord Wolseley (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924), 149 & 185.
4. General Viscount Wolseley, The Soldier's Pocket-Book (Edition 5), (London: MacMillan and Company, 1886), page 178. It is of interest that in editions one and two produced in 1869 and 1871 respectively that there were no rules for dealing with the press or correspondents. However he he did describe newspaper correspondents as "...as those newly invented curse to armies, who eat the rations of fighting men and do no work at all". Edition five gives detail of the licensing of correspondents as well as reproducing a sample set of rules and a guide to selecting a suitable correspondent.
5. Professor Clem Lloyd, The Case for the Media, (Brisbane, 1991) page 6.
6. Bean won the confidence of the soldiers of the Australian Imperial Force at Gallipoli where he lived and worked with them for most of the campaign.
7. John Dye, Censorship: An Old Concept with New Problems, (Carlisle: USAWC, 1987), page 2.
8. Phillip Knightly, The First Casualty, (New York: Harvest, 1976), page 201.
9. The Third Army was activated on 1 August 1944.
10. Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1985), page 157.
11. Operation TORCH was the Allied invasion of French North Africa in October 1942.
12. Ibid., page 175. Patton's wife subscribed to a clipping service and she kept him informed.
13. Colonel Arthur J. Simpson, Press Censorship in the Theater of Operations 1942-45, (New Jersey: 201st Field Press Censorship Detachment (AB), 1975), page 60.
14. Regulations For War Correspondents, 1944, page 3.

15. The other items covered included, quartering, clothing, feeding, transport, pay, complaints, communications, status, licenses, baggage, medical and accreditation.
16. Ibid., page 129.
17. Ibid, page 129.
18. Ibid., page 129.
19. Operation COBRA was the Allied operation to break through the German defenses in July 1944.
20. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers 1940-45, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), page 484.
21. Simpson, page 130.
22. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, page 544.
23. To be fair this approach was not limited to Patton's 3rd Army and manipulation of the press was widely practiced in all theaters throughout the war.
24. Ibid., page 568.
25. Ibid., page 657.
26. The Patton Papers record many instances when Patton personally thanked the press for the job they had done. In a four week period between 30th March and 27th April 1945 he thanked journalists at press conferences for their efforts on three separate occasions.
27. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, page 545.
28. In the letter he stated he just couldn't help what is printed. He also wrote to the commander of the troops concerned correcting any perceived misapprehension.
29. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, page 249.
30. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, page 624. What Patton particularly disliked were Bill Maulin's cartoons showing typical infantrymen as unshaved and dirty. He threatened barring the paper from his area unless there was an improvement.
31. Blumenson, page 261.
32. The force consisted of 16 tanks, 27 half tracks, seven jeeps and three motorized assault guns.
33. Ibid., page 288.
34. Interview with Charles Lynch as quoted in Phillip Knightly, The First Casualty, page 333.
35. Lloyd, page 12.

36. United States Central Command. This unified command although headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida is the US military formation responsible for much of the Middle East.
37. General Yeosock arrived in Saudi Arabia on 6th August 1990 as a member of Secretary Cheney's party. General Yeosock remained in the Gulf when the Secretary's party, left his task being to liaise with the Saudis in the positioning of forces. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Larry Gresham and thus HQ 3rd Army (forward) consisting of two would eventually grow to command an army of 333,000.
38. John Fialka, Hotel Warriors (Washington: The Woodrow Center Press, 1992), page 67.
39. Ibid., page X.
40. This term was coined by Walter Porges, an ABC network vice president. Quoted in Fialka, page 6.
41. United States Army Central Command. The senior army headquarters in the KTO.
42. See, CJCS Washington DC 182305Z MAY 90.
43. Annex S, Media Policy, Department of Defence Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, page S2.
44. Appendix S to USCENTCOM Report to Congress.
45. Ian Bickerton et al, 43 Days, The Gulf War (Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company, 1991), page 177.
46. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992) page 432.
47. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Mike Kendall, XO 3rd Army, during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
48. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Kendall.
49. Schwarzkopf, page 437.
50. Lieutenant Colonel Kendall speculates that Yeosock would have agreed to the requests and that Waller may have acted differently if he had not had a confrontation with the press in December 1991.
51. See COMUSARCENT Operations Order DESERT STORM, page F-1-6.
52. Ibid., Appendix 1. See also Endnote 13.
53. Fialka, page 12.
54. The Marines being on the right flank, or eastern side of the KTO, had the benefit of shortened lines of communication and were within a one hour drive of Al Jubayl.

55. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Kendall.

56. Fialka is scathing in his book, Hotel Warriors, of the efforts of Army Public Affairs Officers especially particular officers in VII Corps.

57. During the TET offensive in South Vietnam in 1968 the Viet Cong were beaten and suffered severely. Nevertheless, because the US government had been consistently less than truthful to the US people, President Johnson could not convince the nation of the importance of the victory. Instead of becoming a positive turning point, which may have led to military success, it became the beginning of the end of the US commitment.

58. Operation RESTORE HOPE was the US Military operation in 1992-93 aimed at restoring and securing vital supplies for the Somali people.

59. Lloyd, page 11.

60. General Schwarzkopf stated on Larry King Live on 30th September 1992 when asked if he had manipulated the media; "...by direction from the highest level there was no manipulation of the media; but if they made a mistake we did not necessarily correct them." Schwarzkopf then used the anticipated Marine amphibious assault as an example.

61. See, Far Ahead of the Pack, an article by Susan Tifft, TIME Australia, 28th January 1991.

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